Recently in Studies/Reports Category

Source: Ellen Dannin, The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law, July 10, 2009. Penn State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19-2009

Abstract:     
For all but those who have an ideological commitment to privatization, the issue driving privatization is how to fund public infrastructure. Thus, arguments for privatizing infrastructure are (1) to provide money so cash-strapped governments can fix crumbling infrastructure and (2) to shift future financial risk to the private contractor, as well as, of course, the financial rewards.

The reality, though, is far different. Provisions commonly found in infrastructure privatization contracts actually make the public the insurer of private contractors' return on investment. Indeed, were it not for the lengthy provisions that protect contractors from diminution of their expected returns, the contracts would not run on for so many pages.

Of greater importance, infrastructure privatization contracts give private contractors a quasi-governmental status, with power over new laws, judicial decisions, propositions voted on by the public, and other government actions that a contractor claims will affect toll roads and revenues.

Source: Ellen Dannin, Pennsylvania State University - Dickinson School of Law, April 2, 2003

 

.... Despite what we have learned recently about how critical information technology is, how easily it can be misused - and how expensive that misuse can be - both federal and state governments are pursuing a course of privatizing information that seems to know no bounds. Private companies now have contracts to provide a wide range of services that involve generating and collecting highly personal information, including social and mental health services; education, medication and psychiatric services; unemployment benefits processing; accounting and information technology; legal services; permit application, payment of taxes or fines, and car registration.

 

 ........ This transfer of important functions from public to private control should be at the center of national debate. It affects our national security, our personal security, and our finances. Yet there has been deafening silence - except for those who cheerlead every movement from public to private control. The time has come for national debate on this issue.

Source: Linda Casey, National Institute on Money in State Politics, 2008-11-06

Since the mid-1990s - through six legislative sessions and three gubernatorial administrations - Alaska's lawmakers have made more than a half dozen attempts to privatize prisons. These attempts have met with unfavorable public opinion. To date, the strength of public opposition has prevailed, and all private prison proposals have been defeated.

Link to report

Source: Harald Bergsteiner, Macquarie Graduate School of Management; Gayle C. Avery, Macquarie Graduate School of Management, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Advance Access originally published online on May 7, 2008
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2009 19(3):631-660


Public and private sector organizations and their constituents are subject to numerous, often competing, accountability pressures. Guidelines are lacking on how to identify and depict the extent and nature of multiple constituency (MC) relationships. This article identifies limitations of five existing MC schemas. A proposed new MC matrix integrates seven accountability dimensions identified from the literature. The new matrix depicts potential accountability relationships and their nature and functions as a normative and diagnostic tool. The utility of this matrix for normatively depicting multiple accountability relationships and diagnostically monitoring accountability performance is illustrated by reference to prisons run by private operators.

Source: Christine A. Kelleher, Villanova University; Susan Webb Yackee, The University of Wisconsin at Madison, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Advance Access originally published online on July 24, 2008; Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2009 19(3):579-602

We argue that contracting opens a pathway for organized interests to lobby public managers. Using multilevel modeling techniques, we test this proposition with data from administrative agencies in the American states. We find that interactions between organized interests and managers increase in the presence of contracting. We then demonstrate that the influence of organized interests over key state agency decision making is driven, in part, by whether an agency contracts out for public service delivery.

The findings suggest the presence of an alternate pathway for organized interests to access and influence government decision makers. Moreover, these results complement previous studies, which primarily highlight the potential economic benefits of contracting and hold important normative implications for our understanding of government responsiveness in an era of decentralized governance.